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Title 
Patient autonomy and choice in healthcare: Self-testing devices as a case in point 
 
 
Introduction 
The growing number of self-testing diagnostic devices available for home use raises a number of 
ethical, psychological and social questions. Such devices allow individuals to test for a range of 
medical conditions in the absence of medical supervision. These devices are on sale in pharmacies, 
super-markets and a growing online industry where over a thousand tests are listed (Parliamentary 
Office of Science and Technology, 2003). It is now possible to test for HIV (albeit only one system 
approved) (Federal Drug Administration, (FDA) US, 2009), genetic markers (Levitt, 2001), response 
to coagulation therapy (Heneghan et al., 2006) and glaucoma (Ianchulev et al., 2005) without leaving 
one’s home. The premise underpinning the nature and availability of these devices, which is noted in 
their marketing strategies, is that they assist individuals to be more autonomous in the assessment and 
management of their health by assuming a more independent role. Increased patient autonomy is 
assumed to be a good thing. In this paper we critique this assumption. We do not oppose patient 
involvement in care, but rather seek to critique a particular understanding of patient autonomy and its 
practical implications.  
 
We propose that diagnostic self-testing is a specific instance of the application of a developing model 
of patient autonomy in healthcare policy and practice. Recent legislative change and health policy in 
Ireland and the UK support this direction (Department of Health and Children, Ireland (DoHC), 
2008a; Department of Health UK, 2008). Patients are now granted increased independence in the 
management of their own health and associated decision-making. Various forms of paternalism are, 
for the most part, viewed as antiquated and sometimes unethical. Patient autonomy, choice and 
freedom in decision-making have been embraced as part of a progressive philosophy for healthcare 
delivery. Wilson (2007, p.354) refers to “the antipaternalistic assumptions” of modern bioethics which 
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are claimed to support these views. We suggest that policy-makers have adopted these ‘assumptions’ 
to underpin current healthcare policy with little substantive debate.  
 
The aim of this paper is to reflect on these ‘assumptions’ and the extent to which autonomy, in so far 
as it is often construed as patient choice and freedom in decision-making, represents a progressive 
principle for healthcare delivery. The central thesis here is that current perceptions of autonomy do not 
represent a progressive philosophy for healthcare, as they fail to capture the multi-dimensional nature 
of the concept and undermine other significant issues such as relationality, care and responsibility. 
The paper draws on the philosophical literature and examples from the self-testing process to support 
this claim. The self-testing process represents a specific microcosm of greater patient involvement and 
autonomy in healthcare and therefore provides an ideal practical context for discussion. We conclude 
by offering an alternative account of autonomy which may better serve patients. We accept that 
autonomy is constituted, perceived and valued differently in various cultures. This paper draws 
primarily on the Irish, UK and US perspectives; therefore, we acknowledge that the discussion has 
relevance primarily in a Western context.1  
 
The argument 
The argument we propose may be outlined as follows. Current healthcare ethics and recent social 
policy documents uphold patient autonomy as a paramount ethical principle. This model of autonomy 
goes beyond merely encouraging participation as autonomy is increasingly portrayed as individual 
freedom to choose. Such a model is not a suitable benchmark for healthcare policy, or professionals, 
because (a) it represents a one-dimensional, sometimes misguided, perception of autonomy associated 
with the absence of constraints and (b) it denies important considerations of relationality, care and 
responsibility which may better serve patients. Therefore, healthcare practice and policy, which 
uphold the primacy of autonomy and equate it with increased patient choice and freedom in decision-
making should be reviewed, or at least accepted with suitable qualification. 
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Autonomy, freedom to choose and contemporary healthcare  
Prior to further discussion of autonomy, and its application in healthcare, some initial understanding 
of the term is required. A definition will not be outlined at this point as one of the central issues under 
discussion here is what the essential nature of autonomy is.2 However; some sense of the term must be 
delineated to allow the argument to proceed. In general usage ‘autonomy’ refers to a multi-faceted 
concept encompassing such elements as “self-governance” and “self-rule” (Oxford University Press, 
1997) The word is derived from the Greek ‘autos’ which refers to the self and ‘nomos’ which refers to 
laws. In this original sense autonomy referred to a political system shared by a group of citizens. A 
city in ancient Greece had ‘autonomia’ when its people were in a position to make their own laws 
(Dworkin, 1988). 
 
An understanding of autonomy as a feature of individuals is widely attributed to Kantian philosophy 
where individual agents, as opposed to societies, are viewed as the locus of autonomy (O’Neill, 1992). 
Within contemporary healthcare the term is often used ambiguously and inconsistently whereby 
different interpretations suggest different ways of respecting autonomy (Keenan, 1999; Aveyard; 
2000; Slowther, 2007). Beauchamp and Childress acknowledge the multifaceted nature of the concept 
but define autonomy as; “self-rule that is free from both controlling interference by others and from 
personal limitations, such as inadequate understanding, that prevent meaningful choice” (2001, p.58). 
 
The association of autonomy with lack of interference inherent within this definition is significant. It 
associates autonomy with freedom or liberty.3 Foster (2009) denies any ambiguity in healthcare 
regarding the term autonomy and notes in a rather glib fashion, that everyone is quite clear what 
autonomy means. It refers to “straightforward libertarianism” (p.3). The libertarian view of autonomy 
is associated with freedom from constraints and reflects the notion of ‘negative’ liberty as articulated 
by Berlin (1969). In accordance with negative liberty one’s freedom is in proportion to the degree of 
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non-interference. The libertarian context of autonomy, associated with individual freedom to choose, 
is growing in popularity in Western healthcare practice (Scully et al., 2006; Varelius, 2005) and 
creating a consumer like culture of free choice (Moreno, 2007). There is increasing criticism of this 
consumer culture within the literature. The basis of the criticism is that patient autonomy now takes 
precedence over professional judgement within the consultation process with potential negative 
consequences for patients (Downie, 1998; O’Neill, 2002; Mol, 2008).  This position will be developed 
as the paper proceeds. 
 
Contemporary professional codes of conduct, healthcare ethics texts and policy documents provide 
some empirical evidence of this shift towards greater patient autonomy. Gillon’s (2003) proposal that 
autonomy should be upheld as the first principle has gained momentum in medical ethics. The Irish 
Medical Council’s (2009) most recent direction to its members, while acknowledging some 
exceptions, asserts the patient’s right to control what happens to her in accordance with her autonomy. 
One particular medical ethics textbook outlines autonomy as the “primary consideration in patient 
centered treatment” (Schwartz et al. 2002, p.8). The Irish Department of Health and Children has 
increasingly noted the need for greater patient involvement at all levels of health service delivery. This 
includes mental health service provision (DoHC, 2006), safety management (DoHC, 2008b) and 
chronic illness strategy (DoHC, 2008c). The latter policy states, as one of its core principles, that 
patients “should actively participate in the management of their condition” within a healthcare system 
that maximises opportunities for self-care (DoHC, 2008c p.22).  
 
However, current policy goes beyond merely encouraging participation in one’s own immediate 
health. A recent DoHC and Health Service Executive (HSE) document (DoHC and HSE, 2008c) 
outlines a global strategy for increased user involvement in the health services. The opening chapter 
suggests that service users should be central figures not only in matters affecting their own care, but 
also with regard to service design and provision. The language of the document is very consumer 
orientated. This language, and proposed initiatives such as a patient charter, supports the advent of the 
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patient as an autonomous discerning customer in the healthcare arena and significantly alters the 
patient/healthcare professional relationship (Mol, 2008). Ryan et al. (2010) associate the current 
increase in the use of self-testing devices with these policy shifts in a UK context. The authors suggest 
that patients may self-test as they perceive this to be a desirable aspect of self-care which is promoted 
by the government.  
 
This rhetoric of patient autonomy now permeates healthcare practice and policy replacing previous 
paternalistic models of care and a culture of medical dominance (Rothman, 2001). This shift is 
attributed to a number of complex social developments. The literature provides a thorough account of 
these developments which include the advent of neo-liberalism, economic rationalism, consumerism 
and associated litigation, the commercialisation of medicine and an increasing lack of trust in doctors 
and healthcare institutions (Rothman, 2001; Willis, 2006; Eldh et al., 2006; Kapp, 2007).4 Modern 
American bioethics5 has also contributed significantly to this change where the principle of autonomy 
has gained increased prominence as the leading ethical principle underpinning healthcare delivery 
(Moreno, 2007). Moreno refers to “an autonomy-driven bioethics” (p.417) in the US fuelled by 
several social events including the blatant disregard for participants in the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Experiment (1932-1972), the emergence of the Belmont Report in 1973 detailing ethical principles for 
research and the influential Roe v Wade decision in 1972 which focused on personal rights and 
liberty. 
 
Autonomy and Self-testing 
Moreno (2007) notes that patients’ recognition of their right to autonomy in healthcare has greatly 
influenced the rise of consumerism and supported corporate interests with regard to direct-to-
consumer advertising. The author mentions self-testing as a particular example of the interplay 
between increased patient autonomy and consumerism. Much of the debate regarding the value of 
self-testing diagnostic devices centers on their role in advancing an individualistic paradigm in 
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healthcare delivery, which replaces a previously more stringently controlled and professional-led 
healthcare system. This is particularly true in the context of ethical analysis where the ability to self-
test and possibly diagnose without, or with reduced, professional support is seen as an example of 
extended patient autonomy and questioned on this basis (Modra, 2006; O’Lynn, 2007; Kearns et al., 
2010). Self-testing diagnostic devices are marketed as a means to encourage patient participation in 
healthcare and improve overall health outcomes through the early diagnosis of disease (Simplicity-
health, 2009). It is proposed that this early participation is a ‘good’ thing. Essentially these devices 
facilitate greater patient autonomy in the context of diagnosis and management of disease.  
 
Studies which investigated the efficacy of diagnostic self-testing kits such as glaucoma computer 
based tests (Ianchulev, 2005); International Ratio testing (Henegan et al., 2006) and blood glucose 
monitoring (Towfigh et al., 2008; Alleman et al., 2009) display clinical results which support their 
value as diagnostic tools. However, despite the positive outcomes noted here, this is not the case for 
all home testing systems. There is considerable debate as to the value of home blood glucose 
monitoring, particularly in patients who are not treated with insulin, and research studies reveal 
different estimates with regard to clinical outcomes (Farmer et al., 2009). One study in the UK found 
that clinical outcomes in the context of blood glucose levels were improved when patient self-testing 
was replaced by a more proactive patient education programme (Harris and Cracknell, 2005). This 
study also revealed that patients were relieved not to have to self-test on a regular basis, as testing 
reinforced the illness role and resulted in feelings of failure and negative health related behaviours 
when results were poor. A considerable portion of self-testing diagnostic tools refer to home screening 
systems, e.g. prostatic antigen (PSA) tests as a method of screening for prostatic cancer. Despite one 
web-site declaring that ‘early diagnosis significantly improves the outcome of any prostate disorder 
treatment’ (Simplicity-health, 2009) the empirical evidence in the context of prostate screening 
suggests otherwise. There is no conclusive evidence that routine prostate screening improves health 
outcomes (Illic et al., 2006), and routine screening is not recommended in the general population but 
rather reserved for those who exhibit certain risk factors (Burger and Kass, 2009).  
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The literature with regard to the extended autonomy afforded to patients in the context of self-testing 
devices, though mainly discursive and non-empirical, raises similar concerns. There is a potential for 
self-testing devices, including screening initiatives, to promote a culture of the worried well 
(McMahon, 2009) and contribute to psychological distress due to the possibility of false positives 
(Modra, 2006) and the lack of pre-test counselling (Raffle, 2000; Kachroo, 2006; O’Lynn, 2007). 
Whellams (2007) makes a rather more sinister claim. The author contends that industry’s eagerness to 
gain FDA approval for home HIV testing kits in the US was not proportionate to consumer demand 
for the product. Whellams’s thesis is that corporate motivation for marketing these products is linked 
to the ease with which future diagnostic self-testing systems may then be commercially marketed. The 
UK Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2010) recently published an ethical assessment of the increased 
availability of medical profiling and online medicine. The report concludes that while certain 
developments may provide some benefits the claims are sometimes overstated and it urges caution, 
greater regulation and the banning of certain facilities including direct-to-consumer imaging.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
Examining current perceptions of autonomy in healthcare 
The argument under examination in this paper asserts that the current model of autonomy in 
healthcare does not provide a suitable benchmark for healthcare policy, or professionals, because (a) it 
represents a one-dimensional, sometimes misguided, perception of autonomy associated with the 
absence of constraints and (b) it denies important considerations of relationality, care and 
responsibility which may better serve the patient.  We shall address the former point initially and 
present two principal arguments in support of our claim. Firstly, a broader philosophical account of 
autonomy goes beyond notions of ‘negative’ liberty to encompass an understanding of ‘positive’ 
liberty which is not necessarily related to the absence of constraints. Secondly, being autonomous is 
not solely concerned with acting on one’s individual desires or wants in an isolated vacuum but 
demands an understanding of our societal connections. Our argument addresses a misrepresentation of 
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Kantian ethics which exists in some healthcare literature to the detriment of a richer understanding of 
autonomy. 
 
Autonomy, constraints and positive freedom 
We argue at this point that contemporary notions of autonomy in healthcare, as outlined above, can be 
questioned because autonomy is not necessarily synonymous with freedom to choose and is not 
dependant on the absence of constraints for its existence. The libertarian understanding of autonomy 
in healthcare subscribes to a negative perception of autonomy. This negative perception does not 
reflect “the positive element of self-determination essential to an adequate account of autonomy” 
(Young 1986 p.49). Delineating the differences between positive and negative notions of freedom and 
autonomy are central to this claim. If autonomy can exist in the presence of some constraining factors, 
then an anti-paternalistic healthcare philosophy which seeks to advance autonomy by promoting 
individual freedom to choose is fundamentally flawed. 
 
In Two Concepts of Liberty Berlin (1969) delineates between positive liberty which is concerned with 
self-mastery and negative liberty associated with non-interference by others. Berlin’s account of 
positive freedom echoes very much a Kantian perspective when he refers to the ‘inner citadel’ where 
people retreat as rational beings to free themselves from desires they know cannot be realised. Berlin 
tells us that we can free ourselves from obstacles in our path by abandoning the path in a self-
determining manner through the use of critical reasoning. We will explain how this is possible in a 
clinical context later in this paper. 
 
Carter et al. (2007, p.3) explain the distinction between positive and negative notions of liberty as 
follows: 
“In other words, when such a theorist [proponent of positive liberty] seeks to determine 
whether people are free, the focus is on what they have done or how they have done it.  For a 
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negative-liberty theorist the focus of any such enquiry is very different. In order to ascertain if 
people are free in some respect, a proponent of negative liberty asks not what they have done 
but whether they are unprevented from doing something”. 
 
This positive, self-determining sense of liberty is also supported by Dworkin’s (1988) appraisal of 
autonomy. Dworkin refers to freedom as liberty and suggests that the terms liberty and autonomy 
should always be distinguished.  He proposes that “autonomy is a richer notion than liberty” and 
relates to “the idea of being a subject, of being more than a passive spectator of one’s desires and 
feelings” (p.107). Dworkin suggests that autonomy and freedom are not synonymous even though 
they may at times be linked. He suggests that in forcing a Jehovah’s Witness patient to have a blood 
transfusion against her will one denies her liberty yet also her autonomy. However, in another 
example Dworkin explains that in deceiving a patient about his treatment, his freedom has not been 
denied but his autonomy is thwarted by the process of deception.   
 
This reflects a re-occurring theme within philosophical literature that autonomy and freedom are 
distinctive and that freedom is not a necessary pre-requisite for autonomy. Scott (1998) articulates the 
difference by explaining that the animals in the field are free, but cannot be said to be autonomous, as 
they do not possess the attributes necessary for autonomous action, presumably, the ability to act as 
rational agents. It would seem therefore, as Scott explains that freedom is not a sufficient or even 
necessary condition for autonomy to exist. Seedhouse (1998, p.184) supports this proposal in stating 
that autonomy is not “necessarily related to the amount of options available” but is more context 
related.  Seedhouse delineates between respecting and creating autonomy and suggests that one can 
create autonomy for another by not necessarily granting all their choices.  
 
Dworkin cautions us against a concept of autonomy associated with significant independence. He 
contends that this understanding “makes autonomy inconsistent with loyalty, objectivity, commitment, 
benevolence and love” (p.21). This statement is particularly relevant in the healthcare context where 
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healthcare personnel are obliged to consider their professional commitments to care for patients. 
These commitments, and their inconsistency with the current autonomy rhetoric, will be explored as 
the paper proceeds.  
 
At this point in the argument we suggest that a notion of autonomy that is equated with freedom to 
choose, in so far as this refers to negative freedom and the absence of constraints, is questionable. The 
discussion regarding positive freedom above raises the issue of one’s desires which is also significant 
in debating the merits of contemporary understandings of autonomy.  
 
Autonomy, Kant, desires and relational responsibilities 
A philosophical analysis of autonomy to this point reveals that choosing to act on one’s immediate 
desires may not be in accordance with one’s autonomy. An autonomous approach to healthcare 
delivery which seeks to facilitate patient freedom of choice, with little interference, does not 
sufficiently appreciate that one’s initially expressed desires may alter following a reflective process 
where other factors are considered. Being autonomous is not solely concerned with acting on one’s 
individual desires or wants in an isolated vacuum but demands an understanding of our societal 
connections. 
 
This view conflicts with the ‘negative’ understanding of autonomy in healthcare which is often 
attributed to Kantian ethics. We propose here that Kant’s philosophy is often misinterpreted in 
healthcare literature to the detriment of a richer understanding of autonomy which may better serve 
patients’ best interests. As a case in point, the medical ethics textbook, noted earlier which portrayed 
autonomy as the paramount ethical principle, contended that respect for autonomy is linked with 
respect for persons and an associated Kantian philosophy which suggests non-interference with one’s 
“plans, ambitions and choices” (Schwartz et al. 2002, p.8). This is not necessarily how Kantian 
philosophers perceive his work.  
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In Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals Kant (1998) sets out an a priori metaphysic of morality. 
Essentially the categorical imperative, its supreme principle, outlines what one ought to do 
unconditionally; “act only in accordance with the maxim through which you can at the same time will 
that it become a universal law” (G 421). In accordance with this imperative people’s duty is to act 
only in a manner that they will their actions to become a universal law of nature. Kantian ethics is 
often portrayed as a judicious approach to morality where a rational being acts solely on the basis of 
principles which are self-embodied and not causally determined or influenced by outside forces. This 
understanding of Kantian ethics is often misconstrued as referring to the autonomous agent and his 
autonomous choices. However, contrary to misinterpretation, Kant’s autonomy of the will does not 
refer to autonomous action; rather it refers to the practical reasoning employed in “determining choice 
to action” (Heubel and Biller-Andorno, 2005, p.7).  
 
Onora O’Neill echoes similar concerns with respect to misrepresentation of Kantian morality.  In 
Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics O’Neill (2002, p.74), takes issue with a number of distinguished 
philosophers who isolate Kant as a major proponent of individual autonomy. “They accuse Kant of 
identifying autonomy with self-control and independence, with extremes of individualism and with 
blindness to the ethical importance of the emotions and institutions” (O’Neill 2002, p.74). O’Neill 
argues that Kant’s unique understanding of autonomy is “quite different from the ethically inadequate 
conceptions of individual autonomy so commonly ascribed to him.”  
 
O’Neill proposes that a careful reading of Kant’s work provides no evidence for a Kantian autonomy 
rooted in individualism. The term ‘autonomous individuals’ does not appear within Kant’s writings. 
Rather, as O’Neill explains, he refers to the ‘autonomy of principles’ associated with a duty towards 
others and respect for their rights. O’Neill’s thesis is that Kant’s reference to ‘self-legislation’ refers 
primarily to a ‘legislation’ that is formulated by oneself in accordance with a number of universal 
principles (which includes one’s duty towards others) as opposed to referring to the ‘self’ legislating 
for oneself in isolation from others. The ‘self’ is reflexive. O’Neill’s argument is that those who 
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associate individual autonomy with Kantian ethics focus on the notion of ‘self’ as opposed to the 
‘legislation’ element of the term. Based on her analysis O’Neill presents the notion of ‘principled 
autonomy’ which is most strongly associated with the principle of obligation. The issue of obligation 
is highly significant in the context of the current argument as it represents one of the alternative 
perceptions of autonomy which may better benefit patients. We will return to the alternatives later in 
the paper but for now we shall continue to outline the misinterpretation of Kantian philosophy as 
highlighted by others.  
 
Paley (2002) also rejects an isolated interpretation of Kantian autonomy. He refers to the ‘myth’ that 
Kant supports a view where individuals make ethical decisions in a detached manner and in isolation 
from the associated context. He takes issue with an ethics of care which is framed in opposition to 
Kant and outlines a convincing argument for an ethics of care underpinned by Kantian philosophy. 
Paley refers to Kant’s Formula of Humanity whereby one is obliged to treat individuals as ends in 
themselves and suggests that adherence to the categorical imperative requires one to seek out the 
‘ends’ of another individual so that one can seek to make them one’s own. Similarly, Heubel and 
Biller-Andorno (2005) note that in applying the Law of Universality, the first formula of Kant’s 
categorical imperative, one is obliged to consider the accordance of one’s maxims with those of 
others. Therefore an accurate understanding of Kantian morality appreciates that Kant “cannot 
reasonably be accused of ignoring the fact that autonomy is about our commitments to other people” 
(Paley 2002, p.135).    
 
Consider an asymptomatic woman who wishes to test herself for the breast cancer gene BRCA1 using 
a home-testing kit.6 Prior to sending off the required saliva sample she discusses this with her partner 
who points out the lack of family history and the fact that a pre-disposition to the disease does not 
necessarily mean one will develop it. He is concerned that knowledge of the gene will affect his 
partner’s outlook on life, and their life together, and tells her so. The woman, previously so certain of 
her wish to undertake the test, now alters her choice and decides not to proceed as she deems her 
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inquisitiveness of lesser importance than the value she places on her relationship and current well-
being. She makes this decision following a process of critical reflection. She does not feel coerced by 
her partner but values his input and sees merit in his contribution.  
 
The extent to which she has chosen ‘without interference’ is arguable yet it is a step further to suggest 
that her autonomy has been violated ‘because’ of the interference, as notions of negative liberty would 
suggest. We propose that in this example her autonomy has been facilitated, as opposed to violated, 
through a dialogue which encouraged her to critically reflect on her initial desires. This reflects the 
positive sense of liberty as noted by Berlin (1969, p.46) earlier in this paper. We suggest that in this 
case the woman has retreated to the “inner citadel” which Berlin refers to using her rational 
capabilities to reconsider her initial desire to undergo the test. This rational self-dialogue, as Berlin 
outlines, reflects a Kantian understanding of autonomy whereby one’s freedom is not constrained if 
she willingly imposes restraints on herself.  In this case the woman has willingly refrained from taking 
the test following a reflexive process which considered her partner’s position. We suggest therefore at 
this point, that one’s decision making processes need not necessarily occur in isolation as some 
interpretations of Kant’s work suggest.  
 
Marcia Baron (1995), in a somewhat similar fashion, addresses some of the criticisms of Kantian 
morality, particularly feminists’ accounts (Noddings and Gilligan) which condemn the emphasis on 
duty in his philosophy as being devoid of emotion and connection with others.  Baron contends that 
this misinterpretation is partly due to a mistranslation of the Groundwork, particularly a translation by 
Paton (Kant 1991) which alters the meaning of Kant’s philosophy. Paton’s translation attributes moral 
worth to those actions which are done ‘for the sake of duty’ as opposed to using the correct translation 
‘from duty’. This is significant because as Baron explains one may act ‘from duty’ in accordance with 
Kant’s universal law but at the same time seek to recognise and fulfil one’s commitments to others.  
However, if one acts for the ‘sake of duty’ it suggests that duty embodies both one’s motive and the 
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desired result. Baron contends that “one’s goal in acting from duty need not be to do one’s duty. Duty 
should be our motivating conception and need not be our end” (1995, p.12).  
 
In accordance with this perspective one may act not solely because one sees it as one’s duty to do so, 
but may seek to assist others at the same time. This reflects Korsgaard’s commentary on the 
Groundwork (Kant, 2008) suggesting that the needs of others are significant for moral agents who 
fulfil these needs because they see helping as their duty. In this context a sense of duty and natural 
inclination towards others, and their concerns, can coexist.  
 
At this point in the argument we propose that it is reasonable to reject a model of patient autonomy 
which is based on an individual’s freedom to choose in the absence of constraints. This model is not 
desirable as it is based primarily on ‘negative’ perceptions of liberty which fail to appreciate the more 
‘positive’, reflexive and self-determining notions of the concept. Furthermore, this version of 
autonomy is often rooted in a misinterpreted account of Kantian philosophy. Kant does not advocate 
an individualistic autonomy. His categorical imperative represents an abstract formulation of moral 
philosophy which does not demand that one exist in isolation from others. In fact, the categorical 
imperative requires that one consider one’s maxims in the wider social context (Heubel and Biller-
Andorno, 2005). The analysis to this point suggests that in accepting a model of patient autonomy 
based on freedom from constraints we are excluding possible alternatives which may be worthwhile. 
The model of autonomy, based on negative liberty, is rejected here because it denies considerations of 
relationality, responsibility and care which may better serve the patient population. In what follows we 
shall address these concepts individually but they are interconnected in ways that cannot, and we 
suggest ‘should not’, be obliterated.  
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Relational autonomy and individual autonomy 
The notion of relational autonomy is significant here. One may reject initial desires and wants, not 
solely for one’s own ends, but to meet the responsibilities one has to others by virtue of one’s 
relationships. Relational autonomy represents a broader notion than individual autonomy. One’s 
decisions may be one’s own while simultaneously influenced by one’s relationships to others. 
Responsibility to others is an integral component of the decision-making process. Relational 
autonomy suggests that individual autonomy fails to capture the interdependent nature of our lives 
where decisions affect not only us but those around us. Relational autonomy is particularly attributed 
to feminist philosophy but is also ascribed to by communitarians and proponents of identity politics 
(Christman, 2004).  
 
Christman (2004, p.143) refers to relational autonomy as: 
 
“the label that has been given to an alternative conception of what it means to be a free, self-
governing agent who is also socially constituted and who possibly defines her basic value 
commitments in terms of inter-personal relations and mutual dependencies”. 
 
This holds great resonance for the healthcare environment. Patients do not make decisions in isolation 
from their families, dependents and social commitments. However, despite some objections to the 
concept of relational autonomy, which are concerned with both its inherent logic and normative 
implications7, we suggest that it provides a framework in which autonomy can be understood as a 
concept which is compatible with the interdependent nature of our lives.  
 
Meyers (1989) account of autonomy as both relational and practical is particularly relevant here. 
Meyers, similarly to Paley and Baron above, takes issue with an isolated autonomy framed in 
opposition to socialisation whereby one acts independently of relationships with others. Meyers 
(p.178) contends that the process of socialisation is critical to an understanding of our true or authentic 
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selves, and that in turn knowledge of one’s true self is essential for an autonomous agent as “without 
reasonably accurate self-portraits, people cannot be self-governing”. This ‘alternative’ model of 
autonomy, as Meyers describes it, involves the enactment of a number of autonomy competencies: 
self-discovery, self-definition and self-direction which are, at least in part, socially constructed and 
render an isolated free-will account of autonomy “dispiritingly fatalistic as well as incomplete” (p.43).  
 
The self-testing phenomenon again provides a platform for this discussion. Kearns et al. (2010) debate 
the autonomous and relational dimensions of the individual and propose that while diagnostic self-
testing tools can advance individual autonomy through independent testing and decision-making, the 
results obtained have implications for one’s “relational responsibilities” (p.201). Somewhat similar to 
the example of breast cancer gene testing above, the paper explains this position in the context of a 
man who finds that he is infertile through use of a home testing kit. Does he have a moral obligation 
to share these results with his partner and thus fulfil his relational responsibilities? The authors raise 
further contextual issues with regard to home testing and utilise the work of Charles Taylor to 
highlight that diagnostic self-testing is not something that occurs in a vacuum but rather holds great 
significance for those who experience the diagnosis. The paper offers an important dimension to the 
debate here as it suggests that decisions about diagnostic self-testing cannot be viewed in isolation 
from the associated contextual issues. We contend at this point that autonomy is a relational concept 
and not dependant on freedom from constraints in so far as constraints are perceived as input from 
those who exist in association with us. A model of autonomy which ignores the relational dimensions 
of a patient’s existence does not encompass the reality of the patient’s experience.  
 
Professional responsibility and autonomy 
The above focus on autonomy as relational is primarily in the context of patients’ relational 
responsibilities towards their significant others. However, there is another dimension to this 
relationality; the relationship that exists between healthcare professionals and patients, and the 
responsibilities that exist by virtue of those relationships. In both contexts autonomy is not merely 
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relational but based on obligation or responsibility. The responsibilities and obligations of the 
healthcare professional are for the most part acknowledged.  
 
As noted above O’Neill (2002) outlines a ‘true Kantian’ notion of principled autonomy which 
involves acting on universal principles of obligation as opposed to an isolated, individualistic 
autonomy. O’Neill’s thesis is that the triumph of autonomy has ‘contributed’ to a mistrust of 
healthcare professionals as opposed to the other way around. Principled autonomy, in accordance with 
O’Neill’s analysis, rejects coercion and deception and provides a basis for a trusting relationship. We 
propose here that in practicing principled autonomy, and considering their obligations towards their 
patients, healthcare professionals can contribute towards an environment of trust. Principled autonomy 
offers an alternative to the libertarian account of autonomy, associated with freedom to choose, 
delineated earlier in this paper.  
 
Consider a patient who contacts his doctor requesting an MRI (an expensive radiological diagnostic 
test) in response to reoccurring knee pain. His doctor is reluctant to order the test as his clinical 
judgement suggests it is not required. The patient is currently receiving medication for a recent 
diagnosis of gout. The doctor is eager that the medication would be trialled for a period of time before 
entering into further diagnostic and treatment regimes. Furthermore, the physician is aware of the cost 
of the test and the carcinogenic risks of frequent and unnecessary radiology. The doctor provides this 
information to the patient. If the doctor refuses to prescribe the investigation it could be argued that 
the patient’s autonomy has been denied. However, it could also be argued that the doctor has acted in 
accordance with principled autonomy which recognises his autonomy and associated obligations and 
relational responsibilities towards the patient. The doctor may also be acting in accordance with his 
responsibilities towards other patients who may require the test in a climate of limited resources.8 
 
Through a process of dialogue the patient agrees, albeit with some reservations, to continue the 
current treatment regime. Perhaps this more interdependent, principled understanding of autonomy, 
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which takes account of the professional’s responsibilities, by virtue of their role, and skilfully 
encourages the patient to engage in critical reflection, might better serve the patient. In this case  the 
doctor has put the principle of non-maleficence before the principle of autonomy. Hofmann and 
Lydashall’s (2008) paper addressing the use of extensive radiological services supports this course of 
action. The authors contend that an overreliance on autonomy in radiology can result in exposure to 
unnecessary radiation. Furthermore, patient autonomy can be misused to reduce the physicians’ 
responsibilities (they may avoid law suits as error is less probable), increase the popularity of the 
profession (as patients get what they want) and generate further income for the medical facility (if this 
is a legitimate consideration). This example supports the central thesis here that a libertarian model of 
autonomy which fails to take account of professional responsibilities is not one which best serves the 
patient’s interests.  
  
An understanding of relational autonomy places an additional responsibility on healthcare 
professionals; an obligation to be diligent and skilful in ascertaining the extent to which choices are 
autonomous. Atkins (2006) applies Meyers’ relational autonomy to the healthcare context. In 
acknowledging the need for critical reflection by the autonomous agent Atkins suggests that such 
reflective processes involve consideration of one’s relationships with others and societal forces. 
Atkins proposes that healthcare professionals can play a skilled role in assisting these reflective 
processes to allow the realisation of a richer notion of autonomy which is not limited to free isolated 
choices. In this context the healthcare professional is obliged to go beyond a patient’s initial 
expression of preferences to illuminate the reasons for these preferences and the societal influences 
which have underpinned them. This is particularly relevant in circumstances where patients choose to 
reject therapeutic interventions 
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Professional care and patient autonomy 
Consideration of the concepts of relationality and responsibility suggests that they are important 
elements of a richer notion of autonomy that seeks to achieve good patient outcomes. These concepts 
are closely linked with the concept of professional care. Holm (1997) uses the term “protective 
responsibility” to articulate the sense of obligation experienced by healthcare professionals towards 
patients in their care. Holm coined the term following an extensive grounded theory investigation of 
the moral problems experienced by doctors and nurses in practice. It relates to the healthcare 
professional’s awareness of the vulnerability patients by virtue of their ill-health, and their need for 
assistance with decision-making regarding care interventions.  
 
‘Protective responsibility’ does not accept autonomy as absolute but recognises that something else 
may be required to maximise patient well-being in times of ill health. Holm (1997, p. 127) explains 
the term as follows: 
 
“When you meet the patient you meet another human being who is vulnerable, who often 
trusts you, and whose life you can influence in a significant way. This creates a special responsibility 
towards the other human being, which can be difficult to understand for outsiders, but which 
nevertheless plays a significant role in the deliberation of health care professionals.” 
 
Protective responsibility may provide a suitable model to bridge the abyss that exists between the 
more stringent positions of autonomy and paternalism.  It recognises the interdependent nature of the 
patient/doctor relationship. This links with Mol’s account of the ‘logic of care’ which she frames in 
opposition to the ‘logic of choice’. Mol (2008, p.43) articulates clearly the tensions that exist when a 
libertarian model of patient choice permeates healthcare. In The Logic of Care, Mol outlines a 
compelling account of the realities of a consumer-based culture in healthcare. Mol’s central thesis is 
that a ‘logic of choice’ is not consistent with a ‘logic of care’ and may lead to ‘poor’ care. Mol is not 
concerned with the abilities of individual patients to exercise choice but rather how circumstances of 
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choice emerge and evolve. From her observations and interactions with diabetic patients Mol 
concludes that more choice does not necessary lead to better care. While the logic of choice is 
concerned with patients as customers and autonomous, independent individuals, the ‘logic of care’ 
suggests a far more messy landscape. In accordance with Mol’s analysis (p.62) “the logic of care is 
attuned to people who are first and foremost related”. Mol encourages doctors to cease ‘managing’ 
patients and return to ‘doctoring’.  
 
Downie (1998) shares a similar perspective in language very closely related to Mol’s account. He 
compares a ‘market relationship’ to a ‘professional relationship’ and contends that while serving the 
bests interests of patients is a feature of the latter, it is not a priority in the former. Downie associates 
this market relationship and consumer understanding of autonomy with Mill’s account of autonomy 
whereby one is free to act as she wishes, regardless of how irrational those wishes may be, provided 
her choices do not cause harm to others. In accordance with Downie’s analysis, a healthcare system 
which refers to patients as customers fuels a culture of ‘consumer autonomy’. This may condone a 
patient persisting with treatment which medical evidence suggests unnecessary or futile. Downie 
outlines an opposing ‘rational autonomy’ which he associates with Kantian accounts of autonomy. 
This links with O’Neill’s (2002) perspective above in so far as Kantian autonomy is more considered, 
than often portrayed in the healthcare context. One makes decisions not solely on one’s initial desires 
or wishes but in accordance with universal rational laws. Downie is quite direct in his criticism of 
‘consumer autonomy’. He contends that a degree of paternalism is inherent within a professional 
relationship whereby the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence may on occasion take 
precedence over respect for individual autonomy. This certainly supports Holm’s account of 
‘protective responsibility’ while also echoing O’Neill’s ‘principled autonomy’ as outlined above. 
 
In specific reference to patient autonomy and the clinical relationship Olsen (2003, p.705) refers to 
“the ethical use of influence” within a patient/clinician context. Similar to Downie above Olsen 
proposes that influence is not only ‘intrinsic’ but ‘desirable’ within the clinical relationship. Olsen’s 
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discussion centres on the process of coercion in mental health practice whereby the use of coercion is 
justified on the basis of a rights-based approach. In accordance with this approach the patient is seen 
as an autonomous self-governing agent who has the right to act free from interference. In this context 
coercion is justified only if the patient lacks capacity to make a judgement or may cause harm to 
himself, or others. Olsen offers an alternative relational approach whereby influence is seen as a 
constant feature of the clinical relationship and treatment decisions are continuous and subjective. The 
relational approach demands that every action of influence, despite its magnitude, is assessed for its 
ethical suitability. Therefore, respect for patients is paramount throughout and the power relationships 
are continuously acknowledged. This perspective is coherent with the principles of relationality, 
responsibility and care outlined in this paper. It provides another example of professional care 
superseding autonomy in a clinical context.    
 
Gillon’s (2003) specific adherence to autonomy as a paramount principle in healthcare practice, which 
promotes the other bioethical principles, has been rejected by Callahan (2003) in favour of 
communitarianism and by Dawson and Garrard (2006) on the basis that it rejects the prima facia 
nature of the principles. The latter argument is significant here as it essentially asserts that the 
professional duty to care demands that one move beyond mere respect for autonomy in favour of 
acknowledging other ethical principles when the context requires it. Dawson and Garrard (2006) take 
issue with Gillon’s position that autonomy is ‘first among equals’ in the context of the four ethical 
principles outlined by Beauchamp and Childress (2001).  They refute Gillon’s argument on a number 
of levels, but particularly with regard to the manner in which his standpoint rejects the Rossian 
perspective of prima facie, as opposed to, absolute principles. In accordance with an ethic of prima 
facie duties (Ross 1967) one principle might triumph over the others in accordance with specific 
situations.  
 
Dawson and Garrard (2006) suggest that justice will take precedence over autonomy in resource 
allocation issues and that the principles of autonomy and non-maleficence can often be in conflict in a 
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healthcare context. The authors also add that in suggesting that autonomy promotes the other 
principles Gillon actually exalts their relevance as opposed to rendering them less important. In 
accordance with Dawson and Garrard’s perspective accepting Gillon’s position would result in a 
return to “moral absolutism and its demand that we regard some principles as exceptionless” (p.201). 
The acceptance of autonomy as the ‘first’ principle could have negative consequences for patient care 
as outlined above. There are numerous other accounts in the literature which suggest that an over-
zealous adherence to patient autonomy may allow individuals to be disadvantaged by their own 
choices, create unnecessary confusion and provide a means whereby healthcare professionals 
abdicate, either intentionally or otherwise, their own professional and caring responsibilities (Holm, 
1997; Scott et al., 2003a; Kapp, 2007; Whitney and McCullough, 2007, Harnett and Greaney, 2008).  
 
The empirical literature also provides some evidence for the proposal that patients value the role 
others take in the decision-making process during their time of vulnerability (Scott et al., 2003b; 
Levinson et al., 2005; Doherty and Doherty, 2005; Hamann et al.,2007). A large-scale survey design 
in Toronto investigated patients’ preferences for participation in decision-making at three levels: 
seeking information, discussing options and making the final decision (Levinson et al., 2005). The 
sample was stratified to ensure representation from the wider population. Results showed that while 
96% of patients surveyed preferred to be offered choices and asked their opinions, 52% displayed a 
preference for leaving the final decision to their doctors.  This echoes Berlin’s assertion that 
“individual freedom is not everyone’s need” (1969, p.40). 
 
Therefore, it appears that a model of autonomy based on freedom to choose does not always meet the 
requirements of care as articulated by patients and healthcare professionals. We propose that the 
interdependent concepts of relationality, responsibility and care are essential components of 
healthcare. An account of patient autonomy which focuses on the absence of constraints may deny 
their existence or minimise their importance. 
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Summary of argument and conclusion 
Patient autonomy is widely acclaimed as the new orthodoxy or ethic for healthcare delivery. This is 
problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, this perception of autonomy is often equated with free 
choice which does not reflect the more positive sense of liberty associated with autonomy. In this 
view self-determination and mastery have greater significance than the absence of constraints.  
 
Furthermore, autonomous choices do not involve acting solely on one’s individual desires in a 
vacuum but encompass a critical, relational, reflexive review of one’s initial wants and an appreciation 
of the impact of choices on others. Misinterpretation and subsequent inappropriate application of 
Kantian philosophy has sometimes contributed to an account of autonomy in healthcare which is less 
than complete and possibly misleading. Finally, a model of autonomy based on freedom to choose, 
which fails to consider the notions of relationality, responsibility and care does not provide the best 
means for increasing human potential. We suggest therefore that the combined arguments outlined 
above provide a platform to question current healthcare policy and rhetoric regarding increased patient 
autonomy and propose that it should be reviewed or at least accepted with caution.   
 
Conclusion: Towards a new model of patient autonomy 
Having raised significant problems with the manner in which autonomy is currently presented in 
healthcare the discussion would not be complete without providing at least some possible solutions. It 
is important note that nothing in this paper should be construed as suggesting that patient autonomy is 
not worthy of consideration. What is suggested rather is that patient involvement in healthcare should 
be underpinned by a sound philosophical understanding of what it means to be autonomous and an 
appreciation that autonomy is not necessarily related to the range of options available, of established 
intrinsic value, or always desired by those it seeks to liberate. The proposals outlined below require 
another paper to delineate how they may work together but it is important to refer to them here to 
close the current argument.  
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O’Neill’s (1992) proposal for judging the value of autonomy could be usefully applied to the 
healthcare setting. In this model autonomy is neither revered nor dismissed but rather viewed in 
context. She suggests that social independence should not necessarily be desired nor dependence 
automatically condemned. Rather independence or dependence should be judged on the basis of 
overall contribution to autonomy and other ‘goods’. As O’Neill (1992) suggests we may do well to 
return to a true Kantian account of autonomy which does not necessarily rebuke interdependence.  
 
Wilson (2007) concurs with much of O’Neill’s perspective and suggests that we should value an 
individual’s capacity for autonomy as a fundamental way of respecting autonomy as opposed to 
necessarily respecting autonomous choices. This echoes Seedhouse’s (1998) position that it is 
essential to differentiate between respecting and creating autonomy and that the latter may not 
necessarily involve granting individuals all their choices. Both positions offer alternative perspectives 
for understanding patient autonomy. O’Neill’s (2002) ‘principled autonomy’ with a focus on 
obligation, Mol’s ‘logic of care’ (2008) and Holm’s ‘protective responsibility’ (1997) collectively 
provide an interconnected labyrinth in which to consider autonomy questions in healthcare. The 
interdependent nature of autonomy within the healthcare setting is central to all these perspectives.  
 
Finally, we propose that Meyers’ (1989) account of relational autonomy, as presented above, which is 
both practical and reflexive presents an overarching framework which could encompass the other 
proposals outlined, and provide a means whereby patient autonomy can be respected as a socially 
constructed, non-isolated, concept. It is timely that we question to what extent patient autonomy 
should permeate healthcare policy, rhetoric and ethics and how we can reconcile respect for autonomy 
with a professional duty of care. We propose that further philosophical and empirical review, in the 
context of diagnostic self-testing and other fields, is required to answer these questions. 
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Notes 
1. The impetus for this paper arose from an exploration of the meanings ascribed to autonomy in 
the philosophical literature. A review of key seminal works revealed an incompatibility with 
the prevailing understanding of autonomy in healthcare and prompted the particular focus of 
this paper. 
2. The use of the word ‘definition’ has particular significance in philosophy. Downie encourages 
the writer to look beyond ‘lexical’ or ‘word-word’ dictionary definitions which merely report 
the common usage of terms. He advocates replacing such nominal definitions with more 
essential definitions. The latter, he contends, can be arrived at through classification and 
analysis. (Downie, R.S. 1994. Definition. Journal of Medical Ethics 20: 181-184.) 
3. The terms liberty and freedom are used interchangeably here as reflected in the work of Berlin 
(1969) and Dworkin (1988). 
4. It is important to note that this genealogy of autonomy is primarily rooted in western liberal-
democratic and liberal-humanistic thought.  Therefore, it is important to appreciate the specific 
cultural context of this discussion. See Pennycook, A (1997) Cultural alternatives and 
autonomy. In Autonomy and Independence in Language Learning, ed. P. Benson and P. 
Voller, 35-53. London: Longmans 
5. The term bioethics is described by O’Neill (2002) as a meeting ground for those who debate 
the legal, social and ethical implications of new advances in medicine, science and bio-
technology. A detailed account of the ‘birth’ of bioethics is beyond the scope of this paper but 
a comprehensive historical account is found in Reich W.T. (1994) The word bioethics; its birth 
and legacies of those who shaped it. Journal of Medical Ethics 4: 319-335. 
6. This example was constructed following a review of Kim Atkins’ paper which is discussed 
later in this section. 
7. Holroyd maintains that while agents may be relational entities autonomy cannot be. See 
Holroyd, J. 2009 Relational autonomy and Paternalistic Interventions. Res Publica, 15:321-
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336. Christman, within his account of relational autonomy, raises a concern that a purely 
relational approach to autonomy may lend itself to an “overarching paternalism” (2004 p.158). 
8. A recent "Liberating the NHS" (2010) white paper proposal, announced by the Secretary 
for State for Health in the UK, suggests a greater role for doctors in managing  budgets at 
a local level through primary care consortia. See British Doctors to take charge of 
spending, www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2010/08/16/gvsb0816.htm (Accessed 4th April 
2011) 
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